Dynamic Binary Instrumentation-based Framework for Malware Defense by Aaraj, Najwa et al.
Dynamic Binary 
Instrumentation-based 
Framework for Malware Defense
Najwa Aaraj†, Anand Raghunathan‡, and Niraj K. Jha†
† Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, 
Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
‡ NEC Labs America, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Outline
 Motivation
 Proposed framework 
 Framework details
 Testing environment
 Real environment
 Experimental evaluation
 Related work 
Princeton University                                                                                                         DIMVA 08 presentation
Motivation
 Malware defense is a primary concern in 
information security
 Steady increase in the prevalence and diversity 
of malware
 Escalating financial, time, and productivity losses
 Minor enhancements to current approaches are 
unlikely to succeed
 Increasing sophistication in techniques used by virus 
writers
 Emergence of zero-day and zero-hour attacks
 Recent advances in virtualization allows the 
implementation of isolated environments
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Motivation (Contd.)
 Advances in analysis techniques such as dynamic 
binary instrumentation (DBI)
 DBI injects instrumentation code that executes as part of 
a normal instruction stream
 Instrumentation code allows the observation of an 
application’s behavior
 “Rather than considering what may occur, DBI has the 
benefit of operating on what actually does occur”
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Ability to test untrusted code in an isolated environment 
without corrupting a “live” environment, under DBI
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Proposed Framework
 Execute an untrusted program in a Testing environment
 Use DBI to collect specific information
 Build execution traces in the form of a hybrid model:  
dynamic control and data flow in terms of regular 
expressions, Rk’s, and data invariants
 Rk’s alphabet: ∑ = {BB1, …, BBn}, where BBj captures 
data relevant to detecting malicious behavior
 Subject RU, a recursive union of generated Rk’s, to post-
execution security policies
 Based on policy application results, data invariants, and 
program properties, derive monitoring model M
 Move M into a Real (real-user) environment, and use it 
as a monitoring model, along with a continuous learning 
process
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 Execution trace generation
 Step built on top of DBI tool Pin 
 Control and data information generated to check 
against security policies
 Regular expression generation
 Each execution trace transformed into regular 
expression, Rk
 Rk’s alphabet: ∑ = {BB1, …, BBn} 
 BBj is a one-to-one mapping to a basic block in the 
execution trace 
 BBj contains data components, di’s, if instruction Ii in 
basic block executes action Ai
 di’s can reveal malicious behavior when they assume 
specific values
Princeton University                                                                                                         DIMVA 08 presentation
Execution Traces and Regular Expressions
 Completeness of testing procedure depends on 
number of exposed paths
 Each application tested under multiple automatically-
and manually-generated user inputs
 Recursive union of Rk’s performed in order to 
generate RU
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Execution Trace Union
 Data invariants 
 Refer to properties assumed by the di’s in each BBj
 Invariant categories: 
 Acceptable or unacceptable constant values
 Acceptable or unacceptable range limits 
 Acceptable or unacceptable value sets
 Acceptable or unacceptable functional invariants
 Data fields, di’s, over which invariants are defined: 
 Arguments of system calls that involve the modification   
of a system file or directory 
 Arguments of the “exec” function or any variant thereof
 Arguments of symbolic and hard links
 Size and address range of memory access
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Generation of Data Invariants
 Updating data invariants: 
 Single or multiple invariant types for all di’s in each BBj
 Observe value of all di’s in each execution trace 
 Start with strictest invariant form (invariant of constant type) 
 Progressively relax stored invariants for each di
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Generation of Data Invariants 
(Contd.)
 Security policy, Pi:
 Pi specifies fundamental traits of malicious behaviors
 Each Pi is a translation of a high-level language  
specification of a series of events
 If events are executed in a specific sequence, they 
outline a security violation
 Malicious behaviors detected by performing RU ∑(Pi)
 Example of Pi  
A malicious modification of an executable, detected post-
execution, implies a security violation
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Security Policies and Malicious 
Behavior Detection
 Malicious modifications include:
1. File appending, pre-pending, overwriting with virus content
2. Overwriting executable cavity blocks (e.g., CC-00-99 blocks) 
3. Code regeneration and integration of virus within executable 
4. Executable modifications to incorrect header sizes 
5. Executable modifications to multiple headers 
6. Executable modifications to headers incompatible with their 
respective sections 
7. Modifications of control transfer to point to malicious code 
8. Modifications of function entry points to point to malicious 
code (API hooking) 
9. Executable entry point obfuscations 
10. Modifications of Thread Local Storage (TLS) table 
11. Modifications to /proc/pid/exe 
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Security Policies and Malicious 
Behavior Detection (Contd.)
 Generation of behavioral model, M
 M is composed of a reduced set of BBi blocks
 M embeds permissible or non-permissible real-time 
behavior
 Program execution run-time monitored against M
 Blocks included in M
 Anomaly-initiating (AI) blocks 
 Anomaly-dependent (AD) blocks
 Anomaly-concluding (AC) blocks 
 Conditional blocks
 Data invariants and flags are added to each block in M
to instruct an inline monitor what to do at run-time
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Behavioral Model Generation
Rk
Example: Deriving M
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 Run-time monitoring and on-line prevention of 
malicious code
 Composed of two parts:
 Check instrumented basic blocks against blocks in 
behavioral model M
 Check observed data flow against invariants and flags 
embedded in M’s blocks
 Apply conservative security policies on executed paths 
not observed in the Testing environment
Framework Details: 
Real Environment 
Princeton University                                                                                                         DIMVA 08 presentation
Outline
 Motivation 
 Proposed framework 
 Framework details
 Testing environment
 Real environment
 Evaluation results
 Conclusion
Princeton University                                                                                                         DIMVA 08 presentation
 Experimental set-up
 Prototype on both Linux and Windows-XP operating 
systems
 Linux operating system:
 Testing and Real environments implemented as two Xen    
virtual domains
 Windows-XP operating system:
 Testing and Real environments implemented as a custom-
installed VMWare virtual Windows-XP operating system image 
 Experiments with 72 real-world Linux viruses and 45 
Windows viruses 
 Also obfuscated versions of available viruses
Evaluation Results
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 Virus detection in the Testing environment:
 Original and obfuscated virus detection rate = 98.59% 
(Linux), 95.56% (Windows XP)
 Best commercial antivirus tool:
 Detected original viruses = 97.22% (Linux), 95.23% 
(Windows-XP)
 Detected obfuscated viruses = 50.00% (Linux), 57.14% 
(Windows-XP)
 False negatives = 1.41% (Linux), 4.44% (Windows XP)
 Malicious effects not specified in security policies 
 False positives = 0% (benign programs with behavior 
resembling that of computer viruses)
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Evaluation Results (Contd.)
 Virus detection in the Real environment:
 Monitoring against behavioral model halts malicious 
execution in the Real environment
 Restrictive policies applied 6.8% of the time (i.e., new 
paths exercised 6.8% of the time)
 Execution time effects:
 Execution time increases by 26.81X (Linux) and 30.35X 
(Windows-XP) in the Testing environment
 Does not impose severe limitations on the approach
 Offline malicious code detection, transparently to the user 
 Execution time increases by 1.20X (Linux) and 1.31X 
(Windows-XP) in the Real environment
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Evaluation Results (Contd.)
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 Current techniques fall short of meeting dramatically 
increasing challenges of malware threats
 New defense mechanism against malware introduced 
 Described system successfully detected a high 
percentage of various malicious behaviors
 Acceptable penalty in the real user environment 
 Approach depends on the accuracy of the security 
policies used
Conclusion
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Thank you!
